Transport-Agnostic Secure Channel Emulation

The product contains candidate inventive engines. They are not described as patented until counsel completes inventorship, prior-art, eligibility, novelty and obviousness review.

Ordinary channel radio, voice capture, channel selection and conventional end-to-end encryption are known and are not claimed. Three combinations are put forward instead, each practicable over ordinary transports and therefore claimed as an overlay rather than as a radio.

The client keeps a numbered channel and a local roster. One send action is expanded into individually addressed deliveries, each carrying a destination-specific signed, hash-linked metering debit, so cost grows with fan-out and every delivery is independently provable.

The receiver selects and squelches on channel identity and priority carried in a readable prefix. The transport need not support broadcast at all — the channel is emulated above it.

Two or more clients derive a matching key set from a shared time window and per-dimension phase offsets: no key-exchange message, no public-key infrastructure, and no trusted external time source. The same local clock and a common period produce the same aperture on both sides, so a session opens with no negotiation payload for an observer to capture.

Data is encoded in balanced ternary with buffer markers inserted at deterministic intervals derived from a record identifier and offset. A tampered or missing marker is detected on decode, and bleed between adjacent sequences is measured rather than assumed absent. The overhead is small and fixed.

Scrambling, signing and metering all happen on the device before anything leaves it. Whatever carries the bytes afterwards — carrier data, Wi-Fi, a mesh radio, a relay — is an interchangeable pipe. The claims name a carrier only as an enumerated embodiment, never as a required element.